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Wallace on Natural Selection: What Did He Really Have in Mind?
(Presented at Bournemouth, U.K. on 7 June 2013)
Charles H. Smith, Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green

Alfred Russel Wallace’s 1858 Ternate paper on natural selection is a famous work in
the history of science. Yet it remains – not overlooked – but under-interpreted. Just
sixteen months after its presentation before the Linnean Society on 1 July 1858, it was
entirely eclipsed by a much weightier work, Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, and
doomed by the inertia of the older naturalist’s influence. Darwin’s appraisals of the
Ternate essay, that Wallace “could not have made a better short extract” of his own
thoughts, and how “even his terms now stand as heads of my chapters,” have been
regarded as the final verdict on the matter, to an extent that we have lost sight of
possible essential differences between the two men’s work.
It is of course true that much attention has been given to the apparent differences
between the two men’s opinions that emerged after 1858, but because it has always
been assumed that they were largely steering the same course as of that date, the
trajectory of Wallace’s thought in particular from then on has been questioned. Thus,
it is he who has been accused of “changing his mind” on crucial issues, as distinct from
the possibility that he had merely stated what he felt comfortable with as of 1858, and
as things turned out was forced to fight a rear-guard action from then on.
In this presentation I should like to take a look at three matters I feel go a long way
toward explaining Wallace’s later deviations from a strict Darwinian track. All three
concern elements of his thought that were present long before 1858. I will portray
Wallace as a heavily Alexander von Humboldt-influenced thinker whose natural
selection model can be summarized as an ecological equilibrium-maintaining “removal
of the unfit” – one which conspicuously avoids any conclusions regarding possible
applications to the evolution of human consciousness.

1. The Setting

Before plunging into the matters at hand, we should quickly review some
conventional interpretations of Wallace’s thought that have, like folklore, become
entrenched in our minds. The starting point for most of these views is Wallace’s own
autobiography, My Life, published in 1905. In this work Wallace presents a passably
detailed account of his early years, along the way discussing many of his influences,
and early writings. Certainly his early experiences as a surveyor left their mark, as did
even earlier ones among a group of Owenists when he lived in London for a short
period in his early teens. His earliest writings, for publication or public presentation,
bear the stamp of nonconformist thinking, concerning such subjects as the proper
arrangement of mechanics’ institutes, mesmerism, emigration, the removal of
antiquated sedition laws, and the advantages of seeking varied forms of knowledge.
In My Life Wallace owns up to early interests in the thoughts of, among others,
Robert Owen, Robert Dale Owen, Thomas Paine, George Combe, Thomas Malthus, Sir
William Lawrence, Charles Darwin, Sir Charles Lyell, and Robert Chambers. With such
influences it has been concluded (correctly) that Wallace’s humanitarian social leanings
developed rather early, even before his natural history ones. On the natural history
side, Chambers and Lyell have been pointed to as the main influences, leading him in a
generally uniformitarian, transformist direction.
Wallace says little or nothing about some other sources that might have strongly
influenced him, however, especially with respect to his natural history views. Three
individuals in particular have been rather overlooked in this regard: Alexander von
Humboldt (1769–1859), Franz Julius Ferdinand Meyen (1804–1840), and Justus von
Liebig (1803–1873).

2. Humboldtian Science and the Wallace Agenda
It is well known that Humboldt was an important inspiration for Wallace’s travels;
he mentions this later in retrospect, and Humboldt’s studies are well-cited in his pre1857 publications. And, of course, he initially followed Humboldt, in his choice of
South America for his first expedition. What is largely unappreciated, however, is the
degree to which Humboldt’s philosophy influenced him. Wallace was familiar with
Humboldt’s Journal of Travels, which had been available in English from 1814 (and in

multiple other translations and editions since that time), since at least his days in
Leicester in 1844–1845, but this work contained relatively little philosophy, being more
a straightforward accounting of Humboldt’s 1799–1804 New World travels. Two other
works by Humboldt, containing a good deal more philosophy of nature, were available
in England during Wallace’s pre-1854 years: Aspects of Nature (1849), and the first
volumes of Cosmos (1847). Aspects of Nature had been available in French since 1808,
and it appears Wallace was able to read some French, perhaps with the aid of his
sister, who was fluent. Wallace refers to this book in his Travels on the Amazon and
Rio Negro, published in 1853, and again cites it in his World of Life in 1910. He also
uses the title as a section heading in three of his books, and beyond this as a phrase in
the general text of six of his books and articles.
Though we cannot be sure when Wallace first read Aspects of Nature, it at least
seems certain he knew the book by the time he embarked on his second set of travels
in 1854. The situation with Cosmos is a bit more complicated. In a letter to Bates
dated 28 December 1845 Wallace states how he has heard “the venerable Humboldt”
supports the views expressed in Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, and how
he (Wallace) has “a great desire to read” Cosmos. He certainly did read it eventually,
as later referrals indicate, but perhaps so even before he left for South America. The
book became available in London in 1847, and an 1852 library catalogue of the Neath
Philosophical and Antiquarian Society, where Wallace volunteered as a curator circa
1845 to 1848, indicates they owned a copy of it – a copy Wallace himself might have
ordered. Further, the Singapore Library owned a copy by 1860, and, more importantly,
so did Sir James Brooke, when Wallace stayed with him in Sarawak in 1854 and 1855.
On reading the work Wallace would have found a wide range of expressed beliefs
with which he would have sympathized. The Introduction to Volume 1 alone contains
dozens of passages with themes visible in Wallace’s later writings. Time permits of
only a few examples here:
“General views lead us habitually to regard each organic form as a definite
part of the entire creation, and to recognise, in the particular plant or animal,
not an isolated species, but a form linked in the chain of being to other forms
living or extinct. They assist us in comprehending the relations which exist

between the most recent discoveries, and those which have prepared the
way for them.” (p. 23)
“Who will venture to affirm, that we yet know with precision that part of the
atmosphere which is not oxygen, or that thousands of gaseous substances
affecting our organs may not be mixed with the nitrogen? or who will say
that we already know even the whole number of the forces which pervade
the universe?” (p. 32)
“…the final aim of physical geography is to recognise unity in the vast variety
of phenomena, and by the exercise of thought and the combination of
observations, to discern that which is constant through apparent change. In
the exposition of the terrestrial portion of the Cosmos, we may sometimes
find occasion to descend to very special facts, but it will only be for the
purpose of recalling the connection existing between the laws of the actual
distribution of organic beings over the surface of the globe, and the
laws of the ideal classification by natural families, analogy of internal
organisation, and progressive evolution.” (p. 48)
Humboldt obviously was a believer in the revelation of general principles, but he
was an even stronger believer in the building up of science through facts. Wallace
would have been delighted to hear words such as these, and coming from a leading
light at that. This was the kind of thinking that might expose the workings of great
natural processes such as transmutation; at the least it suggested that change might
be related to overarching, but yet unknown, characteristics of the environment
connected to climate and landscape. Wallace had already come to similar conclusions
regarding the advantages of acquiring “varied forms of knowledge,” as is apparent
from the content of two of his earliest writings, from around 1843 and 1845. Again,
had he perhaps read Aspects of Nature or some other philosophy-oriented work of
Humboldt even before he encountered Cosmos?
Even if he hadn’t, around the same time he seems to have seen writings by two of
Humboldt’s most prominent protégés, Franz Julius Ferdinand Meyen and Justus von
Liebig. Meyen was a first-rate all-around biologist who died young, but before he did
he turned out one of the period’s classic works in plant geography, Outlines of the
Geography of Plants. It was ten years before the work was translated into English, but
by the middle of 1846 it was available in London, and Wallace’s interest in it is

demonstrated by the inclusion of his name at the end of its list of subscribers. He
almost certainly read it before leaving for South America. Humboldt’s influence on
the book is plain, even without considering the more than seventy-five times Meyen
references the older naturalist’s studies throughout it. Wallace likely would have
been fascinated by its organization, which included sections titled “On the Conditions
of Climate Which Determine the Presence and Distribution of Plants,” “On the
Conditions by Which the Soil Influences the Station and Distribution of Plants,” and
“The Distribution of Plants Over the Surface of the Earth.” The initial pages mention
Humboldt’s observations on the latitudinal gradients in plant species numbers, and
the final section introduces several themes and challenges that Wallace would later
take up in his own work, for example:
“The physiognomics of vegetation teach us, that nature, at the creation of
plants, has distributed them over the surface of the earth according to
certain laws, which are quite unknown to us. We have now learned some of
the external causes which place the more developed and nobler forms of
vegetation in the hot zones; but we know no cause, why the same species of
plants are not always produced in the same conditions of climate.” (p. 99)
Liebig’s name is not usually connected to Wallace’s either, but in one of his later
works Wallace included the following reflection on his early surveying days:
“Living thus almost constantly on the land and among farmers and country
people, I soon took a great interest in agriculture. I studied the works of Sir
Humphrey Davy and Baron Liebig, at that time the great authorities on
agricultural chemistry . . . I really believe that at that period of my life I could
have passed a very fair examination in theoretical and practical agriculture.”
Wallace probably knew Liebig’s Organic Chemistry in its Applications to Agriculture
and Physiology, which had reached English translation from the original German in
1840. Liebig is most remembered for his “law of the minimum,” the observation that
agricultural yield is directly dependent on the least available critical nutrient,
whatever that may happen to be in a particular instance. This “limiting factor” idea
was a central element in the development of ecological theory over the next hundred
years, and it was likely at the back of Wallace’s mind all those years before he hit
upon the natural selection concept, which shifted his attention from large-scale

environmental controls on evolution to the individual-focused process of selection for
adaptive suites. A possible role for the “law of the minimum” in Wallace’s thoughts in
the 1840s and 50s should not be dismissed, as it is but a short step from the principle
to natural selection itself: how might organisms change in a manner allowing them to
exploit environments short on particular nutrients?
Liebig was truly a disciple of Humboldt, as his emphasis on facts and precise
experimental work demonstrates (not to mention a couple of personal interventions
Humboldt exercised in his interest). Curiously, and unlike Meyen, he cites Humboldt
only once in his greatest work, but this was his habit and the truth comes out in his
German edition dedication to Humboldt, in which he states, roughly translated, “I
hardly know whether even a part of the little work which I make bold to dedicate to
you is my own.” Humboldt was also a leading advocate of the careful use of scientific
instrumentation, and this too is a theme that shows up throughout the body of
Liebig’s work.
But what of Lyell? one might ask. Was he not a more important influence than any
of these people? Consider first that Lyell himself is sometimes referred to as one of
the classic proponents of “Humboldtian science,” and his debt to the older man is
clear from his roughly fifty referrals to him in Principles of Geology. By the seventh
edition of 1847 he was beginning to refer to Cosmos. Wallace well may have become
curious about Humboldt through his reading of Principles.
Wallace speaks enthusiastically of Principles in some of his early letters, but
without many specifics. Note also that in his published writings before 1857 he
mentions Lyell only twice, whereas he refers to Humboldt at least nineteen times.
Wallace undoubtedly adopted Lyellian uniformitarianism, but as compared to Darwin
his interest in geology was limited, and what he did publish on the subject early on
was mostly casual records of observation, not the results of fieldwork per se. He did
of course write and theorize quite a bit on the various elements of physical geography,
but in this field Humboldt was king, not Lyell.
I believe, therefore, that Lyell represents a necessary, but not sufficient, cause
when it comes to the subject of Wallace’s progress toward the theory of natural
selection. Uniformitarianism gave him a framework for progressive change, but it
didn’t answer any questions regarding the ecological controls on change.

3. Wallace and the “Simple” Model of Natural Selection
Although Wallace would end up a rather strict adaptationist, he had different pre1858 views on the relation of adaptive structures to evolution. There was at least
some kind of correlative relation involved, to be sure, but to think that every
adaptation had a function was seemingly to adopt creationist or Lamarckian thinking,
and Wallace would have neither of these. Thus, years of searching went on for some
kind of ambient environmental influence that might “coax” transformist inertias out
of existing populations. This distinctly Humboldtian approach yielded some early
writings from Wallace that sound, in retrospect, a bit odd. Most notable is the
following excerpt from one of his in-the-field studies on the orangutan, published in
1856:
“Do you mean to assert, then, some of my readers will indignantly ask, that
this animal, or any animal, is provided with organs which are of no use to it?
Yes, we reply, we do mean to assert that many animals are provided with
organs and appendages which serve no material or physical purpose. The
extraordinary excrescences of many insects, the fantastic and many-coloured
plumes which adorn certain birds, the excessively developed horns in some
of the antelopes, the colours and infinitely modified forms of many flowerpetals, are all cases, for an explanation of which we must look to some
general principle far more recondite than a simple relation to the necessities
of the individual. We conceive it to be a most erroneous, a most contracted
view of the organic world, to believe that every part of an animal or of a
plant exists solely for some material and physical use to the individual, – to
believe that all the beauty, all the infinite combinations and changes of form
and structure should have the sole purpose and end of enabling each animal
to support its existence, – to believe, in fact, that we know the one sole end
and purpose of every modification that exists in organic beings, and to refuse
to recognize the possibility of there being any other. Naturalists are too apt
to imagine, when they cannot discover, a use for everything in nature.”
Three years earlier, in his Travels on the Amazon and Rio Negro, he had written:

“. . . It has been assumed by some writers on Natural History, that every wild
fruit is the food of some bird or animal, and that the varied forms and
structure of their mouths may be necessitated by the peculiar character of
the fruits they are to feed on; but there is more of imagination than fact in
this statement: the number of wild fruits furnishing food for birds is very
limited, and birds of the most varied structure and of every size will be found
visiting the same tree.”
These passages demonstrate just how loathe Wallace was to think that adaptive
structures filled some kind of predetermined function. This nod to the probable
influence of more “recondite” (one of his favorite words) forces, it should be noted, is
also a distinctly Humboldtian notion, and one he was only able to overcome when it
occurred to him that change need not be predetermined if adaptive evolution was a
process of response in whatever direction that accrued advantage. In effect, the
limiting factors notion had been turned upside down: those populations that were
able to select out positive responses to impinging forces were those that succeeded.
And, in the end, he was still left with a Humboldtian understanding, one that
addressed the idea of a fully inter-dependent natural system, as described in the 1858
Ternate essay:
“We have also here an acting cause to account for that balance so often
observed in nature, – a deficiency in one set of organs always being
compensated by an increased development of some others – powerful wings
accompanying weak feet, or great velocity making up for the absence of
defensive weapons; for it has been shown that all varieties in which an
unbalanced deficiency occurred could not long continue their existence. The
action of this principle is exactly like that of the centrifugal governor of the
steam engine, which checks and corrects any irregularities almost before
they become evident; and in like manner no unbalanced deficiency in the
animal kingdom can ever reach any conspicuous magnitude, because it
would make itself felt at the very first step, by rendering existence difficult
and extinction almost sure soon to follow.”
There is something further to take from this understanding, something that is
important but still not usually recognized. Wallace’s model requires engagement of
the environment to effect new selection regimes; it is not itself an evolutionary

understanding. It is instead a representation of a state-space, an ongoing (dynamic)
equilibrium played out between populations and the rest of nature. Wallace himself
described natural selection – on many occasions – as the “elimination of the unfit,”
and nothing more. This realization is consistent both with his steam-engine governor
analogy, his reliance on environmental influence to induce change, and ultimately his
split with Darwin on the relation of the principle to evolution in general. In my
opinion Wallace’s understanding is the more succinct, especially if we understand “the
environment” to incorporate all aspects of extra-population nature, including other
populations (and even other individuals in the same population).

4. A Change of Mind? From What?
The last subject treated here, albeit briefly, is the idea that Wallace had a change of
mind regarding the applicability of natural selection to the evolution of humankind’s
higher faculties. I object to this interpretation, at least to the extent that he had any
reversal of mind, as opposed to a modification of same. The notion that he reversed
himself on this matter is one of the worst examples one can find of the reckless use of
negative evidence. It has been assumed that the 1858 Ternate essay was also, and
explicitly, meant to apply to the evolution of humankind’s higher abilities; there is,
however, absolutely nothing in the essay to support such a conclusion. And,
importantly, he never later cited such a position, or wrote anything directly indicating
he had thought this at that time.
It has been posed that Wallace’s newfound interest in spiritualism in the mid-1860s
might have been the cause of a supposed “reversal,” but in his books Contributions to
the Theory of Natural Selection and On Miracles and Modern Spiritualism, he explicitly
denies any such causality. Others have suggested he simply became disillusioned with
the theory because it could not deal with social realities. To support such positions
various kinds of evidence have been introduced, but none of these hold water. For
example, there is the 18 April 1869 letter to Darwin in which he states: “I can quite
comprehend your feelings with regard to my ‘unscientific’ opinions as to Man,
because a few years back I should myself have looked upon them as equally wild and
uncalled for.” But here Wallace is just stating a fact: his research on spiritualism had
suggested an enhancement of the basic natural selection model that could explain
why humans were endowed with abilities that were not merely survival-related. The

1858 model had not solved this problem for him, and for several years he held back
until he had a solution.
There is a good deal more to this story that I have written about elsewhere, but for
now I just suggest that the 1858 Ternate essay was never meant to extend to an
explanation of the emergence of humankind’s higher abilities, and that Wallace simply
waited – for several years – to say anything further on the matter.

5. Conclusion
In conclusion, I summarize by re-stating my belief that Wallace’s march toward his
eventual discovery of the principle of natural selection was fueled by: (1) his early
explorations relating the logic and relevance of “informed belief” to social evolution
(2) his general acceptance of a uniformitarian approach to transmutation (3) an early
rejection of adaptationism in favor of Humboldtian principles of synergistic “surface
physics” (as Humboldt termed his scientific physical geography) and (4) an inability to
see how the higher faculties of human beings fit into the picture. After 1858 he
continued to contemplate the last matter, coming to a “modification” (as he, at least,
referred to it) of the 1858 position by adding a spiritualistic element to it.
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